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Our nation's ideological commitment to the free market system and
our recognition of the need to regulate particular markets have been
in tension for a century. In recent decades we have come increasingly
to accept the government's expanding responsibility for controlling
business conduct and maintaining the health of the economy. None-
theless debate continues, and the regulatory agencies and commissions
that were created to discharge much of this responsibility are again
being critically examined.' The pace of inflation has also contributed
to the latest round in the debate about economic regulation, since it
has made us much more sensitive to the danger that government in-
tervention in competitive markets may deter innovation, protect in-
efficiencies and increase costs.
With these problems very much in mind, Congress, with the Presi-
dent's endorsement, has recently given serious consideration to several
bills calling for the establishment of a National Commission on Regu-
latory Reform.2 This commission on commissions would have a man-
date to explore the need for fundamental change in the structure and
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I. A good list of the formal studies of regulation that have been undertaken over the
years is found in the report of the most recent such endeavor. ASH COUNCIL, A NEw
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 197
(Gov't Printing Off. 1971). A wide range of viewpoints, most often critical of regulation
as it now stands, is collected in THE CRISES OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy
ed. 1970).
2. See, e.g., H.R. 3104, H.R. 3007, H.R. 2859, H.R. 2514, H.R. 2277, S. 61, S.J. Res. 7,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 4145, S.J. Res. 253, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). As will be
discussed later, the congressional debate has more recently focused on proposals for more
thorough and regular congressional oversight of the regulatory agencies. The House
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, chaired by Rep. Moss, has
recently announced its intention to conduct a review of the independence, performance
and economic effects of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Securities and E. change Commission
(SEC), Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), and Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).
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procedures of the independent regulatory agencies.3 During these de-
liberations, Congress is again hearing most of the traditional criticisms
of economic regulation. A surprisingly broad coalition, however, now
accepts the argument that regulation fails primarily because we regu-
late too much.4 In this new climate, it may be possible to make sub-
stantial strides towards eliminating excessive regulation.5 While this
would be a healthy development, 6 we must not ignore another equally
important defect in our regulatory system.
Government intervention in many important economic activities
will still be necessary to achieve equally major and accepted public
goals, ranging from environmental health and social justice to honest
advertising and product safety. For example, freer entry into the truck-
ing business might well be desirable, but we will probably still wish
to control the size, safety, noise, energy consumption, and air pollution
of trucks.7 While we may doubt the wisdom of continued regulation
of the content of television programs,8 we can hardly leave local tele-
phone rates to the discretion of the utility with the only lines in town.
Since we cannot blame all the evils of regulation on its excessive scope,
3. Hearings on Regulatory Reform-1974 before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4-5 (1974).
4. As early as 1971, the Council of Economic Advisors' Annual Report suggested that
the deregulation of transportation might have to be considered "a matter of urgent
national priority." Lewis Engman has recently observed that deregulation has growing
support from both "survival-of-the-fittest, every-man-for-himself free-marketeers" and
from people, like Ralph Nader, who are "generally viewed as liberal and interventionist
in their approach to the economy." Address by Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, FTC, be-
fore the Financial Analysts Federation, in Detroit, Oct. 7, 1974, at 3. The Administration
has endorsed the view that we overregulate certain areas of the economy. See ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 1975, at 147-59. Indeed, the agencies themselves may now be
leaning in the direction of policies more consistent with economic efficiency. For ex-
ample, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has moved toward accepting the Department
of Transportation's arguments for more flexible pricing in its Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigation. See G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, THE CAB's DoMEsic PASSENGER FARE IN-
VESTIGATION (Brookings Institution, Tech. Ser. Reprint T-008, 1974). Similarly, the Board
recently withdrew its restrictive charter flight guidelines and announced its support for
more liberal rules.
5. As Engman aptly warns, we simply cannot afford to let regulated industries "be-
come federal protectorates, living in the cozy world of cost-plus, safely protected from
the ugly specters of competition, efficiency and innovation." Engman, supra note 4, at 14.
See also Baker, The Great Regulatory Game: All Shall Have Prizes, Apr. 1, 1975 (unpub-
lished remarks at the NYU-Columbia Symposium on Regulation).
6. Reuben B. Robertson has asserted to the Senate Commerce Committee that "the
concept of economic regulation has failed." Hearings on S.J. Res. 253 before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
While this is an overstatement, we agree that the concept of regulation by independent
agencies is in serious trouble.
7. A forceful argument can be made that trucking does not share the potential for
natural monopoly that has been cited in support of regulation in other areas. See Kil-
born, Empty Trucks and Inflation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1974, § 3, at 3, col. 1. No one
would suggest, however, that all aspects of the trucking industry should therefore be
beyond government control.
8. See Hentoff, How "Fair" Should TV Be?, LITHOPINION, Summer 1974, at 25.
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we must not place all our hopes for regulatory reform on the rela-
tively limited amount of deregulation that would be beneficial. It is
equally important to reexamine the effectiveness of the regulatory pro-
grams that will still be required.
The "failure" of many of those programs grows out of a basic para-
dox of our regulatory philosophy: we respect the nonpolitical inde-
pendence of the regulatory process, yet when we dislike independently
made agency decisions, we invoke the political process to change them.9
Precisely because we permit the agencies to regulate independently, we
find that they sometimes regulate in ways that elected officials find po-
litically unacceptable. Statutory intervention by politically accountable
decisionmakers then becomes necessary to change their courses.
Although one-shot statutory interventions are a step in the right di-
rection, they cannot provide effective and lasting political control
over agency decisions. We need also to consider whether and how to
create a system for continuous political monitoring of all government
regulation, to ensure its responsiveness to the changing economic and
social needs that the political process reflects. If independent agencies
are actually making democratic government less effective and less re-
sponsive, we may conclude that it is time to give continuing respon-
sibility for agency action, and continuing power effectively to control
such action, to the officials we elect to run the government.
I. The "Failure" of Regulation
There is widespread feeling that something has gone badly wrong
with our attempt to promote the "public interest" in the regulated
sectors of the economy through independent agencies. Critics have
blamed regulatory failure on many different factors. Superficial cri-
tiques emphasize the role of personal incompetence, administrative
bungling, and the corrupting (or co-opting) influences of regulated
industries. All of these are present to a significant degree in any
bureaucracy, but a theory of regulatory failure based entirely on con-
tinuing and pervasive ineptitude or conspiracy is unacceptably cynical.
Other critics have looked to the way agencies conduct their business.
They argue that agencies should engage in more planning,10 clarify
9. For a seminal analysis of this paradox and its roots, see T. Lowi, THE END OF
LiBE ALISM 125-56 (1969).
10. Louis Hector stressed the need for more effective planning in his thoughtful
critique of the CAB. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
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policy with more rulemaking,'1 eliminate procedural delays'" or, con-
versely, build in better procedural protections to ensure against ar-
bitrary or uninformed regulatory decisions. 3
A few thoughtful commentators have sensed that some agencies may
not be doing their job well because they have been given, or have
selected, the wrong job to perform.14 The current attacks on over-
regulation argue, for example, that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) have failed be-
cause they have tried too hard to protect the industries they regulate
from the forces of competition. Some observers claim that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has squandered its resources on relatively
trivial matters, ignoring a legislative mandate that would permit much
more innovative and significant action. Others suggest that regulation
often fails because agencies are unwilling to be consistent or to follow
through on their actions, creating conditions of partial regulation
which are less desirable than either systematic or nonexistent control.
Agencies thus create "monopoly without effective control, private en-
terprise without effective incentive or stimulus, governmental super-
vision without the possibility of effective initiative in the public
interest."' 5
11. Judge Friendly has appealed for clear policies and standards in The Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 862
(1962); see Hart, The Exercise of Rule Making Power, in PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT 'wITH SPECIAL STUDIES 324 (1937).
12. One example of such delay is the FCC's attempt to resohe a dispute between
radio stations KOB in Albuquerque and WABC in New York. The dispute is 33 years
old and still going strong. See Bacon, The Regulators, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1974, at I,
col. 1. Delay has been called the Achilles heel of the regulatory process. Delay is Judge
Friendly's first item on a bill of particulars against the agencies. Friendly, A Look at tile
Federal Administration Agencies, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 429, 432 (1960). On the other hand,
it has been argued that "agency failures arise in large part from efforts to 'process' work
quickly-to avoid a backlog of cases-while raising as little controversy as possible." S.
BREYER & P. MAcAVoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 129 (1974).
13. The Administrative Procedure Act was the culmination of a long drive to establish
mechanisms to ensure agency fairness, a drive pursued at the expense of agency effective-
ness. A pending bill aimed at curbing overregulation (S. 4260, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974))
may have equally dubious results. It would require each agency to accompany any major
action with a "competitive impact statement" analyzing its cost-benefit effects. It seems
more likely, however, that the requirement would prolong agency delays, without in-
creasing the wisdom of agency decisions. A similar Executive Order, No. 11,821, 39 Fed.
Reg. 41501-02 (1974), establishes a program requiring that each agency within the execu-
tive branch publish "inflation impact statements" in conjunction with major legisla-
tion, rules or regulations. The first lawsuit seeking to delay action by the executive
branch because of failure to comply with this order already has been filed. See Independ-
ent Meat Packers v. Butz, Civil No. 75-1244 (D. Neb., filed Apr. 1, 1975) (preliminary
injunction granted, Apr. 11, 1975).
14. See R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971).
15. A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 328 (1971).
To the extent that competitive forces are not perceived as providing the solutions to
our social needs, nationalization-that historical hobgoblin-may receive more attention
from those who feel the failure of regulation cannot be overcome by institutional reform.
Indeed, it has been suggested that some critics of regulation favor deregulation because
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Although there is truth in many of these observations, 6 we need to
identify and analyze a more basic type of regulatory "failure." Regu-
latory agencies are deeply involved in the making of "political" de-
cisions in the highest sense of that term-choices between competing
social and economic values and competing alternatives for government
action-decisions delegated to them by politically accountable officials.
Agencies exercise their decisionmaking powers with respect to ques-
tions that Congress and the President, based on the best expertise
available, could properly address on their own.lr Regulatory "failure,"
then, as we would define it, occurs when an agency has not done what
elected officials would have done had they exercised the power con-
ferred on them by virtue of their ultimate political responsibility.
Agencies would be said to fail when they reach substantive policy
decisions (including decisions not to act) that do not coincide with
what the politically accountable branches of government would have
done if they had possessed the time, the information, and the will to
make such decisions.
So long as agencies remain "independent," this kind of regulatory
failure is difficult to detect, because with rare exceptions there is no
way of knowing what Congress and the President would have done.
Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that agency success requires the
creation of some mechanism allowing more frequent intervention in
the regulatory process by politically accountable decisionmakers. Now
that conditions change so rapidly and today's massive problems arise
it is likely to create chaos, thereby giving a new measure of respectability to govern-
mental ownership of industry. See R. NOLL, supra note 14, at 109-10. Although few of
the critics are likely to be so motivated, we agree that the need for effective regulatory re-
form is grave and that failure to act decisively in this area will increase pressures for
more, not less, governmental intervention in the economy.
16. It is particularly true that there is an important relationship between the clarity
of an agency's statutory mandate and our evaluation of that agency's performance. See
T. Lowl, supra note 9, at 130-43. However, even the new and decidedly useful notion
that agencies tend to fail when pursuit of their mandates needlessly interferes with com-
petitive forces, see note 5 supra, is inadequate, because it begs the difficult and highly
subjective question of what restrictions on competition are "needless." The bulk of
current regulation is designed to achieve social goals that would not be served by the
operation of competitive forces in presently free or newly liberated markets, and this kind
of regulation cannot be said to fail simply because it is anticompetitive. Often, as in the
case of reducing air pollution, regulation can succeed only if it achieves very different
results from those a "free" or workably competitive market would produce.
As a note of caution to those advocating deregulation, we suggest that such a course,
even accompanied by increased enforcement of the antitrust laws, would not necessarily
produce a marketplace resembling the theoretical free market model. The benefits of
removing regulation should always be analyzed in terms of the likely results to be
reached by the market structure that can realistically be expected to evolve. In ad-
dition, it will be difficult to persuade courts to apply traditional per se antitrust theories
to newly or partially liberated markets, and this problem should be taken into account
when the likely results of deregulation are assessed.
17. See T. Lowi, supra note 9, at 126.
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before yesterday's have been analyzed and solved, government policies
must also change rapidly, and in coordination with one another.' 8
Our independent regulatory agencies, with critical powers over sub-
stantial segments of the economy, were created under statutory policy
objectives framed years before many of our present problems arose.
If our government is to respond to new problems, the agencies must
be made responsible-and speedily responsive-to the elected power
centers we have charged with the job of governing.
There are, of course, many regulatory issues which the President
and Congress consider it politically safer not to address directly-issues
on which they prefer to let the independent and politically unaccount-
able agency take the inevitable political heat. This can hardly be
claimed as a virtue of the present system, since an elected government
ought not to be able to avoid responsibility for governing effectively.
If particular regulatory decisions (or failures to decide) aggravate in-
flation, retard desired economic growth, harm the environment, or
achieve benefits worth less than their economic cost, the elected of-
ficers of our government ought to have the power to prevent such
acts or omissions, and ought to be held accountable for letting them
occur.
We can get some sense of how such a system would work in practice
by looking at the relatively few instances in which Congress and the
President have intervened or attempted to intervene to change a specif-
ic regulatory policy or result. For example, Congress acted decisively
by statute' 9 to overturn the politically unpopular seatbelt interlock
regulations of the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administra-
tion. There have been recent presidential and congressional initiatives
aimed at achieving some deregulation of transportation, banking, and
18. One might fairly say that during the past 25 years "the" critical economic prob-
lem has shifted from (1) the economic prostration of Europe to (2) economic aid to
developing countries to (3) our excessively favorable trade balance to (4) the Eisen-
hower recession to (5) the economic and social disadvantages of our minorities to (6)
the inflation started by the Vietnam War to (7) the excessive accumulation of dollars
abroad and the growing economic strength of Europe and Japan to (8) the protection of
the environment and the curbing of growth to (9) the growing shortages of energy and
other resources to (10) the OPEC cartel to (11) the deepening economic recession and the
lack of economic growth throughout the Western world. The average time for a critical
problem on stage center, before being displaced by a new one, is about two and one-half
years, much shorter than the time required to deal with it adequately, given the cumber-
some and uncoordinated regulatory and legislative processes that currently prevail. To the
extent that we do deal with them, we tend to solidify our answers in new single-purpose
statutes and single-mission institutions, oblivious to the likely need for rapid adjustment
when the next problem hits.
19. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendment of 1974, 88 Stat. 1470.
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natural gas.20 The Federal Reserve's monetary policies and its long
tradition of independence have also come under renewed attack.21
On the other hand, the limited nature of political intervention is
not necessarily a fair measure of regulatory success. The current quasi-
legislative, quasi-executive, quasi-judicial structure of the agencies gives
them a powerful defense against overt political intervention. 22 More-
over, it is difficult and time-consuming for the President and a working
majority of Congress to unite to change a particular regulatory result
or pattern of behavior by enacting a new law each time a change is
desired. The Framers built into our constitutional system a large mea-
sure of inertia against change. Nonetheless, we may surely question
whether they envisioned a governmental structure in which "inde-
pendent experts" would make major policy decisions, for which the
legislators and the President would not consider themselves-or be
considered by the electorate-to be either responsible or accountable.
We must, of course, recognize that neither Congress nor the Presi-
dent can possibly deal with all of the numerous and complex ques-
tions necessarily involved in any attempt to regulate the economy.
That consideration (as well as reluctance to accept the political risks)
gave rise to the delegation of such matters to regulatory agencies in
the first instance, and to the vagueness and inconsistency of the stan-
dards the agencies are instructed to apply. But the necessity of dele-
gation should not disguise the fact that whatever legitimacy inheres in
agency action stems from a delegation of politically based power. We
cannot fault our elected leaders for delegating responsibility when that
is the only way to do the job. But perhaps we should fault them-
rather than praise their commitment to agency "independence" and
"expertise"-when they delegate authority and refrain from reviewing
20. See H.R. 5291, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Financial Institutions Act); S. 3237, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Transportation Improvement Act); S. 2842, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) (Transportation Regulatory Modernization Act); S. 1092, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
(Modern Railway Transportation Act); H.R. 640, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2553,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
21. See H.R. 3160, H.R. 3161, H. Con. Res. 133, S. Con. Res. 18, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). The numerous recent calls for general regulatory reform are themselves a good
indication that many agencies are failing in the important sense that politically account-
able officials perceive that their chances for reelection will be diminished if they are
identified with and held responsible for the results caused by decisions of the regulators.
22. Doctrines as lofty as the principle of the separation of powers have been corrupted
into an argument against such intervention. The agencies, according to the congressional
debate on the Federal Trade Commission Act, were to be subject "'only to the people of
the United States,' free from 'political domination or control' or the 'probability or
possibility of such a thing,' to be 'separate and apart from any existing department of
the government-not subject to the orders of the President.'" See Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935).
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and correcting the acts of their delegates in order to avoid respon-
sibility for how the job is done.
II. Origins and Shortcomings of "Independence" and "Expertise"
Economic regulation by independent experts has grown in an in-
cremental and fragmentary manner without any coherent underlying
plan.2 3 Since few government structures arise in any other fashion, it
is meaningless to attribute the failure of regulation to its patchwork
background. To the contrary, the misguided set of notions that have
led to regulatory failure, as defined above, were all too consistently
adhered to and applied during the evolutionary process. Any hope of
improvement depends upon identifying, reappraising, and where neces-
sary correcting these underlying conceptions.
Our early faith in independent expertise arose from the idea that
regulation ought to be "kept out of politics." The essential impulse
behind this idea was the notion that there is a discoverable, unitary
and nonpolitical truth called the "public interest," that political con-
cerns interfere with the objective search for this truth, and that we
therefore need pristine decisionmakers who will not deviate from the
search for this truth by taking into account the conflicting concerns
of politically significant groups.
This concept is partly responsible for the early adaptation of the
judicial model to the regulatory process.2 4 Building on the constitu-
tional right to due process and the valid principle that a good judge
should be nonpolitical, we have judicialized our regulatory system to
the point where administrative records are larger than judicial records
and regulatory proceedings take longer to resolve than judicial pro-
ceedings. The idea that politicians and the political process are in-
herently evil, and that the judicial model of governmental decision-
23. The complex hodgepodge we call regulation is not "the product of any farsighted
plan or design or the result of any thoroughly worked-out rationale or theory. Step by
step, whether in state or nation, it has represented a series of empirical adjustments to
felt abuses. It has been initiated by particular groups to deal with specific evils as they
arose, rather than inspired by any general philosophy of governmental control." M.
FAINSOD & L. GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONoMY 226 (1948).
24. This acceptance of the judicial model may also have resulted in part from the
historical accident that the first ICC chairman was a judge. Judge Thomas M. Cooley is
hardly to be blamed for invoking the model of sound governmental action he knew best.
In part, he merely realized early what many agencies were later to learn-that regulatory
decisions were more likely to survive judicial review if they were clothed in the "protec-
tive coloration of the judicial environment." Id. at 35. Furthermore, then as now,
businessmen tended to abstain from direct interaction with the government, thereby
rendering lawyers, with their tendency to favor case-by-case consideration of issues by an
objective decisionmaker, the "residuary legatees of the political process." Id. at 15.
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making is therefore to be preferred, is an idea deeply rooted in many
American reform movements. 25 Covert attempts to influence regulatory
decisions for unworthy political reasons, such as rewarding a contri-
butor or punishing an opponent, are not mere folklore from our fron-
tier past; they continue to the present day, as the Watergate tapes so
starkly reveal. Our continuing interest in protecting economic regu-
lation from this kind of political interference is therefore neither po-
litical naivet6 nor idealistic paternalism. But the architects of our regu-
latory schemes appear to have extended a legitimate aversion to such
covert methods to a more questionable elimination of mechanisms that
would allow elected officers of the government to intervene openly
in the regulatory process and take responsibility for its results.
26
In addition, support for regulatory independence has been gen-
erated, in part, by a desire for continuity and stability in the regulation
of economic affairs. Some proponents of independence have suggested
that regulators must have terms of office longer than that of any given
Congress or presidential administration in order to have time to master
the complex issues before them and to develop and apply reasonably
predictable, consistent and stable policies. Similarly, the idea that agen-
cies should be independent from one another has been buttressed by
arguments that a narrow focus is required to foster expertise and pro-
fessionalism. "Singleness of concern" has been cited as a virtue pre-
cisely because it is said to "quickly develop a professionalism of spirit
-an attitude that perhaps more than rules affords assurance of in-
formed and balanced judgments."
27
25. As Mr. Dooley put the matter in 1906:
It seems to me that th' on'y thing to do is to keep pollyticians an' business men
apart. They seem to have a bad infloonce on each other. Winiver I see an aldherman
an' a banker walkin' down th' sthreet together I know th' Recordin' Angel will have
to ordher another bottle iv ink.
F.P. DUNNE, DISSERTATIONS BY MR. DOOLEY 275-81 (1906). The notion that government
should be independent from politics stems, in part, from the fact that the first regulatory
agencies were created during the late 19th century and the Progressive Era, when "good
government" reformers were advocating the separation of administration from politics.
As Marver Bernstein aptly states in his groundbreaking work on agency independence,
regulation by independent commissions was designed to be "regulation without tears."
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT CosMISSION 37 (1955).
26. One recent commentator speaks critically of presidential attempts to influence
regulation. Despite his earlier acknowledgment that the President is the "sole officer of
government who derives his mandate from the nation's voters at large," he decries "the
rise of politics and the decline of expertise inside the agencies." L. KOHLMEIER, JR., THE
REGULXTORS 36-52 (1969).
27. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 99 (1938). Joseph B. Eastman, perhaps the
most distinguished member of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the 1920's, told
the American Political Science Association in Washington in December 1927 that the
need for a regulatory commission arises "when the legislative body finds that particular
conditions call for continual and very frequent acts of legislation, based on a uniform and
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Our belief in the virtues of independence has even operated to limit
the President's ability to give direction to the regulatory bodies that
have been created within rather than outside the executive branch.
The Food and Drug Administration, the National Highway Traffic
and Safety Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the numerous agricultural commodity
boards, the Social Security Administration, the Wage and Hour Admin-
istration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Oil Import Board and
many other administrative bodies perform important regulatory func-
tions within one of the executive departments. But, as a practical mat-
ter, none of them is at present significantly more amenable to presi-
dential directives on specific policy issues than are the independent
agencies.
28
The beneficial results predicted for regulation by independent ex-
perts have not been realized, however, despite all the claims made in
their behalf. Some critics tell us that independent agencies have been
captured by the industries they regulate. 2" Instead of praise for useful
continuity, we hear complaints about excessive bureaucratic rigidity.
consistent policy, which in themselves require intimate and expert knowledge of numerous
complex facts, a knowledge which can only be obtained by the process of patient, im-
partial, and continual investigation." J. Eastman, The Place of the Independent Com-
mission, CONSTITUTIONAL RaV., Apr. 1928, at 95J102.
28. There does not appear to have been any clean-cut separation or meaningful dis-
tinction between the sorts of problems committed to independent agencies and those
committed to the control of bureaucracies within the executive branch. All governmental
acts affect the economy in some way. Even if independence did give rise to some virtues,
independence in any given field of government regulation is no more than an accident
of history. For example, both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (in the execu-
tive branch) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (outside the executive branch)
concern themselves with consumer protection in overlapping areas. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) (outside) and the Department of Agriculture (inside) have
similar authority over exchanges; jurisdiction depends on whether a "security" or a
"commodity" is traded. The functions of the Department of Justice (inside) and the FTC
(outside) overlap. Numerous executive departments concern themselves with problems of
a nature and magnitude not substantially different from those addressed by independent
regulatory bodies.
As a practical matter, the inside agencies are no more subject to presidential direc-
tives on specific policy issues than the independent agencies. At least as to decision-
making on a record, it would probably be regarded as a gross breach of the principle of
independence for the President to order or even to suggest that one of the agencies
decide a particular issue in a particular way. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(e), 557 (1970). Even the
relatively simple idea that the President should be able to achieve a common position
by the executive departments on a given policy issue pending before an independent
agency has been strongly resisted and hard for Presidents to achieve.
29. A perceptive observer sets forth the argument that regulators may become ex-
cessively interested in the problems and the needs of the regulated because the elected
officers of government ignore the regulators, while representatives of industry are the
only people in Washington who appear to think they are important. R. NOLL, supra note
14, at 100.
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Instead of receiving credit for professionalism, agencies are accused
of mediocrity3" and an unhealthy and narrow parochialism. 31 We have
less faith in the independence of our regulators than we have in the
integrity of our judges. As the present drive for deregulation shows,
we lack confidence in the ability of appointed and independent "ex-
perts" to reach the correct balance between social goals and economic
costs.
It could be argued that these failures and difficulties stem from not
having insisted strongly enough on the absolute sanctity of agency in-
dependence and expertise.32 It is more likely, however, that the under-
lying problem stems from the very notion of delegating the various
tasks of regulation to independent experts. Over the years, as society
and technology have become more complex, the tasks facing the regu-
lators have changed drastically. Basic policy decisions now need to be
reexamined more frequently, more rapidly, and with broader perspec-
tive. The concept of delegation to independent experts fails to take
adequate account of this change.
Expert advice and the independence of those who give this advice
are still of great importance, and ultimate decisionmakers cannot be
without such counsel. However, as we are beginning to recognize, regu-
lation today involves political choices between competing interests-
concerning which economic and social goals to pursue, how far and
at what economic and social cost.33 Under our constitutional scheme,
these are choices that only politically accountable officials who are
"dependent" rather than "independent" and "generalists" rather than
30. It has been suggested that Presidents hesitate to appoint capable and aggressive
commissioners because such persons would be beyond effective control. E. HERRING,
PUBLIC ADMINIsFRAiON AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 88 (1936). But it seems more likely that
because of the multimember character of the commissions, the opportunity thus presented
to reward campaign supporters, and the conviction that any given appointment will
neither change agency policies nor arouse public scrutiny, Presidents conclude that such
appointments do not warrant close attention and care.
31. We tend to agree with those critics who suggest that "professionalism," even if it
could be achieved, is not the virtue most appropriate to the task of making public policy.
As William Cary has said, "professionalism is fundamentally destructive of good ad-
ministration, because it is a special kind of class system which views public policy
through blinders." IV. Cary, The Federal Regulatory Commissions, Apr. 4, 1952, at 3
(lecture delivered at Princeton University, mimeo).
32. Indeed, professionalism retains its defenders. They charge both that some regulators
are too closely tied to industry by prior contacts or employment and that others are not
expert enough because they have been appointed through the political process and have
not had such prior experience. The ironies and contradictions inherent in "conflict of
interest" reform proposals are well described by Bayless Manning in The Purity Pot-
latch, 24 FED. B.J. 239 (1964).
33. As Geoffrey Vickers has observed: "[All social goals] are systematically related;
some require each other; some exclude each other; nearly all compete with each other for
limited resources .... G. VIcKERS, FREEDoS! IN A ROCKING BOAT 125 (1970).
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"experts" should be making.34 The regulatory agencies should not
have more independence from the political process and more oppor-
tunity to apply expertise to nontechnical decisions than is consistent
with effective, democratic government.35
Furthermore, agency decisions based on professionalism in pursuit
of a single objective are likely to fail us in an age when most of our
important problems cut across the artificial boundaries of any given
agency's jurisdiction and its narrow expertise. Agencies that focus
mainly on energy resources and only tangentially on the environment,
or vice versa, cannot take into account our priorities and interests as
a whole. 36 Even if one were to make the absurd asshmption that we
could fill every position in every agency with a renaissance man, and
a politically sophisticated one at that, no single agency has been given
all of the tools that would be necessary to steer the economy in a
coordinated and comprehensive fashion. Instead, we have a patchwork
of specialized and fiercely independent agencies with different per-
spectives, whose concerns necessarily overlap and whose actions may
contradict one another. For example, fossil fuels, nuclear power, pipe
and transmission lines, rails, tankers, employee health and safety, air
and water quality, motor vehicle performance standards, taxes, import
restrictions, and energy research-11 related components of the energy
problem-are each within the jurisdiction of a different agency.37 Each
would be the first to urge that its own statute does not permit it to
subordinate its own mission to other interests. We can hardly depend
on them to arrive at the right decisions by consensus.38
Congress, assisted by the courts, has recently provided a vivid illus-
tration of this overseparation of powers among independent agencies.
The National Environmental Protection Act requires that before any
34. One early student of the regulatory process, John Maurice Clark, found the
tendency to keep regulation out of politics quite disquieting. As he noted, "politics is
the democratic way of governing; has it become necessary, then, to keep government itself
Out of politics?" J. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 490 (1939).
35. See T. Lowi, supra note 9, at 154-56.
36. For a careful analysis of the need for centralized economic planning, and the
suggestion that we need to "veer dangerously close to an abrogation of the market sys-
tem in an effort to preserve it," see Address by Robert V. Roosa to the Atlantic Institute
for International Affairs, reprinted in THE AsA. BANKER, Dec. 10, 1974, at 4.
37. In order, Interior, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), FPC, ICC, Martime
Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Transportation, Treasury, International Trade Commission
(ITC) and Energy Resources and Development Administration (ERDA).
38. Even if representatives of all the agencies sat down together to attempt to reach
a consensus, their decision would be formed in large part by the institutional strengths of
the various agencies represented at that meeting, a capricious factor at best. We have
learned from experience that inter-agency committees are not very good at solving inter-
agency problems.
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agency takes a significant federal action, it must prepare-and then
consider-an environmental impact statement, including a comparison
of the proposed action with other less harmful alternatives. In Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,39 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that before issuing licenses
for offshore oil drilling, the Department of Interior had to consider
other alternative courses of action to meet energy needs, including the
construction of more nuclear power plants and a change in the Federal
Power Commission policy on natural gas pricing, actions the Depart-
ment itself had no power to take.
Suppose that the Department had opted for more nuclear plants
and higher natural gas prices, judging them less harmful to the en-
vironment than offshore drilling, and that the power companies and
natural gas producers had then applied to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for the
required approvals. Suppose next that the NRC, preparing and con-
sidering its own environmental impact statement, was persuaded by
the foes of nuclear plants that they are more damaging to the environ-
ment than offshore drilling and gas pipelines, and that both more off-
shore drilling and more natural gas are superior alternatives to meet
energy needs. And suppose finally that the FPC, in doing its own im-
pact statement, concluded that gas pipelines are more damaging, or
that there were other reasons for holding down natural gas prices, and
that one of the other courses was preferable.
Under the present structure of regulation by separate and indepen-
dent agencies, the impasse would be complete. All three agencies would
have performed their statutory duties to the letter. Therefore, all three
decisions would have been affirmed by the courts. The problem re-
quiring action would remain unsolved.
These basic weaknesses of separate and independent agencies, each
grappling with different small parts of large, interrelated problems are
aggravated by the generality of the statutory mandates they have been
given. With few exceptions, the agencies' enabling legislation casts
them completely adrift in a sea of generalized and often conflicting
policy objectives. The Regional Rail Reorganization Act, for example,
requires the Final System Plan for the new eastern rail system to meet
criteria of economic viability, effective competition, adequacy of freight
service, establishment of improved high-speed passenger service, at-
tainment of environmental quality standards and maximum efficiency
39. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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consistent with safety, and protection of labor and communities against
losses-criteria that, if taken literally as having equal priority, could
be achieved only in utopia.40 In contrast, other statutes use as their
sole guiding criterion "the public interest."
4 1
For all these reasons, independent agencies understandably find it
hard to divine the decisions that would have, but have not, been made
by politically accountable officials. The President and Congress find
it equally difficult and often politically inconvenient to step in with
specific guidance or direction. It is therefore not surprising that agen-
cies, navigating by their own bureaucratic stars, frequently reach re-
sults that might be costly to incumbent politicians if they were viewed
on election day as responsible for these actions and choices.
The success of regulatory agencies, like other efforts designed to
promote the public interest, depends largely on obtaining political
guidance and support for their actions. 42 This may explain a puzzling
phenomenon of the regulatory process-the fact that agencies "age,"
much like human beings. Almost all agencies have been viewed as
more vigorous and successful in their early years, and less effective
as they grow older.43 This perceived success of young agencies may
result less from their youth than from their role in pursuing sub-
stantive goals that our political institutions have just recently pro-
claimed and continue to support. The politically determined social and
economic priorities that are reflected during the process of creating
a new agency change with the passage of time. The phenomenon of
agency aging could have less to do with the symptoms of staff arthritis
than with growing distance and alienation from the current political
process.
While informal contacts with politicians continue and even increase
as an agency ages, opportunities for formal and visible political di-
rection of an agency decline over time as the presumption in favor
of agency independence and expertise grows stronger. As intervention
40. Pub. L. No. 93-206, 87 Stat. 985 § 206(a) (1974).
41. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a), 310,
312 (1970.
42. Agencies often do not realize the truth of this fact. As Marver Bernstein percep-
tively observed in 1955, "the single most important characteristic of regulation by com-
mission is the failure to grasp the need for political support and leadership for the
success of regulation in the public interest." M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 101.
43. According to Washington folklore, Justice Black suggested that every statute
creating a new agency should limit its life to 14 years. While Justice Black may have
had tongue in cheek, Professor Lowi has made a serious and persuasive argument for
just such a reform-a "Tenure of Statutes" Act that would require each agency to be
legislatively renewed every five to 10 years. T. Lows, sup'a note 9, at 309. The continuing
vigor of the SEC-the most visible exception to the aging process-may be due to the
clarity and continuing political acceptance of its antifraud and full disclosure missions.
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by politicians is channeled into less visible and less official modes, it
is increasingly assumed that politicians need not undertake responsi-
bility for agency actions and that any overt attempts by politically
accountable officials to influence regulatory policy are improper. The
cycle feeds itself until the reality-that the most important agency
decisions have a political content for which politicians should be held
accountable-is completely lost from sight.
Our faith in independence and expertise has created this dilemma,
and only our faith in the political process can resolve it.44 Only elected
officials can provide the requisite overview, coordination, and practical
political judgment to weigh competing claims, make the necessary
ultimate decisions, and stand accountable at the polls. We need today
a mode of economic regulation that is broad enough to consider
the impact of regulatory decisions on the society as a whole, and
flexible enough to adapt to crises we can rarely foresee much before
they are upon us.45 We need to allow for wider shifts in emphasis
and direction within shorter periods of time. To paraphrase Clemen-
ceau, economic regulation has become too important to leave to the
regulators.
40
III. Returning Regulation to the Political Process
If we cannot rely on independent and expert agencies to provide
us with flexible, coordinated, and politically acceptable policies of
economic regulation, we must find guidance either from Congress or
the executive branch, or some combination of the two. For many years,
the President and Congress have been battling about which, if either,
should exercise control over the hybrid fourth, or regulatory, branch.
44. William Cary, a staunch defender of agency independence, has said that an
agency head is "in politics" "whether he likes it or not." W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES 139 (1967). To the extent that agency actions often have substantial
political importance, this statement is accurate. We also agree that politicians at times
seek to influence agency action on an informal basis-but that sort of involvement hardly
leads to political accountability.
45. For example, environmental policies formulated a mere five years ago now may
need to be rethought in the face of the rapidly developing energy crisis and the pressure
of rising energy prices on environmental protection costs. Our insistence on competitive
behavior in our foreign as well as our domestic commerce may need modification to
enable us to cope with foreign governmental commodity cartels. See generally Davidow,
Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying Cooperation, 84 YALE L.J. 268 (1974).
46. "[Tjhe control of business remains too controversial and too vital a political issue
to be entirely relegated to any commission independent of close control by the policy-
formulating agencies of the government. Administrators cannot be given the responsibili-
ties of statesmen without incurring likewise the tribulations of politicians." E. HERRIN,
supra note 30, at 138.
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To a considerable extent, the struggle has been a defensive one, with
each elected branch seeking to prevent the other from exercising
active control, but with neither consistently wanting to do so itself.
The appeal for independence is itself a battle cry often heard in con-
gressional attempts to prevent presidential intervention in the regu-
latory process. That battle has cut agency policymaking adrift from
any meaningful, coordinated and visible oversight by politically ac-
countable authority. A top priority in reforming regulation should
be to take a closer look at this ongoing battle between the branches,
to reevaluate the code words so often invoked, and to reassess our
views as to which branch, if either, should be the victor.
Of course, lthe presidential power to appoint agency members pro-
vides an occasional opportunity to influence agency policy; yet few
Presidents have used it effectively. 47 President Eisenhower invented
the idea of giving the chairman of each independent commission a sec-
ond hat as special assistant to the President, a practice soon eliminated
because of the jealousy of other agency members and opposition in
Congress. President Ford has recently required all agencies within the
executive branch to prepare economic impact statements on the in-
flationary results of proposed actions, although he felt unable to apply
his order to the independent agencies. 4S There has never been a broad
public perception that the President wields, or that he ought to wield,
enough control to be held accountable for the actions of the inde-
pendent agencies, 49 and congressional attempts to check the President's
limited power to intervene in the regulatory process continue up to
the present time.50
If what we need is more flexible, coordinated and politically ac-
ceptable regulatory policymaking, it can be argued that the President
47. See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONs 681 (1941); E. RED-
FORD, ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROL 279 (1952). Even this power is
limited, of course, since Presidents do not have the power to remove agency members.
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
48. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41501-02 (1974). No doubt because the
tradition of independence has spread even to the agencies within the executive branch,
see p. 1404 supra, they have been slow to respond.
49. For the view that agency independence from the executive has eroded severely
over the years, see MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FE.. B.J. 1
(1968). The author cites budget approval, Department of Justice control over litigation,
central clearance of legislative proposals, clearance of requests for information (now
done by GAO), and the President's power to appoint chairmen as examples of this
erosion.
50. Congress has recently been considering S. 704, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), a bill
designed "to restore the independence of certain regulatory agencies." The bill would
require, among other things, submission of agencies' budgets and legislative proposals to
Congress at the same time they go to OMB. The bill would also give agencies more
control over the conduct, of their civil litigation, thereby diminishing the role of the
Department of Justice.
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should be given much more extensive power and responsibility to in-
tervene in the regulatory process-whether he wants it or not. Even
the critics of expanded presidential power would probably admit that
the President is capable of acting more quickly than can the Congress
in formulating and articulating national policy goals. In addition, the
President and his immediate staff have an overview of government
management-and a constitutional responsibility for executing all the
laws 1-that is not shared by a single regulatory agency, by any spe-
cialized congressional committee or by the Congress as a whole. The
President is the only nationally elected officer, and thus, at least ar-
guably, our most politically accountable official. He is uniquely situat-
ed to intervene (at least in a limited number of critical instances)
in order to expedite, coordinate, and, if necessary, reverse agency
decisions.
Nevertheless, arguments for greater presidential involvement in the
regulatory process52 are far from winning universal acclaim.5 3 Even
to advance an argument in favor of expanded presidential power over
the regulatory process may appear rash at a period in our history when
Watergate is such a vivid memory. We at least ought to look long
and hard at all other feasible alternatives before advocating any fur-
ther accretion of power in the White House. This is particularly desir-
able in light of recent developments indicating that the Congress itself
may be willing and able to undertake increased oversight of regulatory
policymaking.5 4
There certainly are strong theoretical arguments in favor of legis-
lative rather than executive oversight and intervention. Congressional
inquiry and debate may be more likely to lead to sound policymaking
than either the President's exercise of his own discretion or the limited
give and take that may occur among the presidential staff. Just as
many regulators have defended the virtues of the collegial body, 5s pro-
51. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3.
52. See R. NOLL, supra note 14, at 92-93; E. REDFORD, supra note 47, at 306-12; A NEw
REGULALTORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 40-41.
53. Judge Friendly, among the most thoughtful and experienced critics of the regula-
tory process, has said of such proposals, "I find it hard to think of anything worse." H.
FRIENDLY, TnlE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 153 (1962).
54. See S. Res. 71, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (proposed a joint study of regulation by
the Senate Committees on Commerce and Government Operations). The House estab-
lished oversight subcommittees by means of the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974,
H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. The Senate is currently considering similar action. S.
Res. 55, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
55. The Ash Council, see note 1 supra, of course took a strong opposing view. Virtu-
ally every student of regulation will concede that confining ultimate decisionmaking
power to one person increases both the chances for efficient and decisive action and the
risls of abuse.
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ponents of greater congressional responsibility are sure to cite the
dangers inherent in the possibility that a President and his staff may
become isolated or responsive only to a favored constituency. More-
over, the Congress is in a way more politically accountable than the
President. The members of the House stand for election more fre-
quently,50 and many members of both houses run for reelection. There-
fore, unlike a second-term President, few are immune from the judg-
ment of the polls.
The argument against the institutional superiority of Congress as a
regulator of the independent agencies is also strong. It is based on
practical considerations and historical experience. Neither Congress
nor the majority party in Congress is responsible for "forming a Gov-
ernment" in the parliamentary sense, or for executing any of our
laws. The institutional strength of Congress lies in setting policy
standards that can command the support of a congressional majority.
This often requires unfocusing policy decisions to a level of gen-
erality inadequate to provide continuing guidance to particular agen-
cies on particular issues. Furthermore, Congressmen represent narrow
constituencies and Congress itself is divided into committees and inter-
est groups that frequently fail to reflect a truly national perspective
and in fact often parallel the narrow interests of each regulatory
agency.5T This structure may prevent it from exercising the collective
will required to undertake meaningful and formal oversight of the
regulatory agencies as a whole. 8
There are some signs that this is changing. Congress has recently,
for example, recognized the need to focus and exercise its collective
judgment over fiscal policy as a whole by enacting the Budget Con-
trol Act of 1974. 59 And in an important recent address supporting a
resolution to exert greater congressional control over the Federal Re-
serve Board, Senator Proxmize attacked the whole idea of indepen-
dence and expertise:
If we have learned anything in the last few years, it is that so-
called experts always can benefit from the views of Congress. It
is time to recognize that this is not Plato's republic but the
56. As an institution, even the Senate is in this respect as accountable as the President,
despite Senators' six-year terms, because one-third of the Senate must face the electorate
every two years.
57. It has been pointed out that Congress has difficulty running its own restaurants.
58. We can hardly hope for a new Joint Committee on Economic Regulation with
powers that will parallel those of the new Joint Committee on the Budget.
59. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
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United States of America. It is time that we in Congress rid
ourselves of our institutional inferiority complex.
As elected officials we are accountable to the voters for our
actions. When we cast a vote our political necks are on the line.
If we were to direct the Federal Reserve to pursue an inflationary
policy, we would soon be out of office ....
In contrast to the Congress, the members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve.. . are accountable to no one.
There are some who applaud this lack of political accountability
on the basis of the mistaken theory that monetary policy should
be insulated from political pressures. This ivory tower view of
monetary policy is wrong both in theory and in fact. 60
Since the independence of the central banking function has long been
considered almost as important as the independence of the judiciary,
an appeal for political control over the Board signals a reevaluation
of independence carried to the farthest extreme. Although both Con-
gress and the President0 ' ultimately shied away from so overt an at-
tempt to intervene in monetary policy, Senator Proxmire's attack on
independence has been echoed in the present political drive to force
more deregulation on the agencies. Perhaps for the first time in re-
cent years, there is a growing awareness on Capitol Hill that regulation
should be more politically accountable, and there is some indication
that Congress may itself be able to undertake the necessary oversight
role. It remains to be seen, however, whether this awareness will trans-
late into effective action. The institutional obstacles persist. 62
If neither the President alone nor the Congress alone should be
relied upon to give direction to regulatory policy, there remains the
60. Senator Proxmire was speaking in support of S. Con. Res. 18, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), designed to increase congressional influence over monetary policy as administered
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. (A related resolution, H.R. Con. Res.
133, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to
monetary policy, was passed by both houses in the spring of 1975.) Since the Federal
Reserve Board makes monetary policy by the purchase and sale of government securities
through its open market committee, rather than by issuing regulations or adjudicative
orders, Senator Proxmire was directing his remarks to a phase of the Federal Reserve's
activities beyond the scope of the statute proposed in this article. 121 CoNc. REc. S. 1843-45
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1975). See also JOINT ECONOMIC CoaMa-IrTEE, 1975 REPORT, S. Rep. No.
61, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 31, 77 (1975).
61. Conversation with the President, Apr. 21, 1971 (CBS interview).
62. The tendency of Congress to pass the policy buck has most recently and aptly been
demonstrated by the passage by the Senate of the standby Energy Authorities Act of
1975, S. 622, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (now in the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce). David Broder has said about this bill, "By the most charitable inter-
pretation, the senators abdicated their responsibility for hard decisions and left the
country with what can only be called a false front facade of an energy policy." Wash. Post,
Apr. 23, 1975, at 18, col. 8.
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choice of vesting this responsibility in some combination of the two.
Such a system could combine the President's ability to act quickly and
pursue a single consistent policy with Congress's collegiality and ability
to check an arbitrary and isolated President. Political accountability
would be maximized by involving both the President and Congress,
who are responsible to different voting constituencies. Without in-
fringing on the basic value of the separation of powers among the
three original branches of government, such a system would reduce
the present isolation of the hybrid regulatory branch, and the myriad
sub-separations within that branch, to a point where government would
be better able to perform the functions we demand of it today.
IV. A Proposal
To accomplish this, a series of one-shot statutory corrections of spe-
cific agency errors is unrealistic. Some more lasting kind of statutory
change will be necessary. Professor Lowi, in a pioneering study, sug-
gested that two types of statutes would be helpful-statutes setting more
precise standards for actions by the agencies, and a basic Tenure of
Statutes Act that would require each agency to seek statutory renewal
of its mandate every five to 10 years.03 Both types of statutes would
make a positive contribution, but neither would provide a continuing
responsibility to review and, where necessary, to correct agency deci-
sions as they are being made. A more basic change is needed.
As a first step to bring the decisions and policies of the independent
agencies within the continuing control of both elected branches of
government, and to require the elected branches to assume continuing
responsibility for the work of their offspring, we suggest a statute that
would authorize the President to modify or direct certain agency ac-
tions, and to set priorities among competing statutory goals, subject
to a one-house congressional veto and to expedited judicial review.
Our proposed statute would have the following principal features:
(1) The President would be authorized to direct any regulatory
agency (a) to take up and decide a regulatory issue within a speci-
fied period of time, or (b) to modify or reverse an agency policy,
rule, regulation or decision (with the exception noted in paragraph
4 below). Such action could be taken only by Executive Order
published in the Federal Register, setting forth presidential findings
that the action or inaction of an agency on a regulatory issue (or a
63. T. Lowi, supra note 9, at 309; see note 43 supra.
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conflict in the actions or policies of various agencies) threatened to
interfere with or delay the achievement of an important national
objective, and stating the reasons for such findings.
The required findings are intended to limit exercise of the Presi-
dent's authority to truly significant policy issues, and to free the Presi-
dent from countless appeals to intervene. 64 The traditional reluctance
of Presidents to take the political responsibility for intervening in
agency affairs should provide an ample safeguard against overzealous
use of this authority. The formal Order is proposed both to assure
visibility and to require careful reflection and public explication each
time the President decides to act.
(2) No such Order could be issued until 30 days after publication
of a notice in the Federal Register stating the President's intention
to consider doing so and inviting written comments from interested
members of the public thereon. All such comments would be main-
tained in a public docket file. No public hearing would be required.
The President and his staff would not be barred from receiving
oral presentations from interested persons (except where the affected
agency's own ex parte rules would bar such a presentation to the
agency itself), but a public record of those attending any such in-
formal meeting and a summary of what took place would have to
be kept.
The purpose of the notice is to assure not only visibility but a
chance for all concerned to make their views known. A public hearing
at this stage would appear unnecessary, but it seems unwise to bar any
oral presentation that would be permitted at the agency level, so long
as the fact of the meeting is made public.
(3) Any such Executive Order would not take effect for 60 legis-
lative days, and would not take effect at all if within such 60-day
period either house of Congress adopted a resolution setting it aside.
The purpose of the 60-day period is to give Congress an opportunity
to hold hearings and reach its own decision. If either house disagrees
with the President, the agency would be left to pursue its own course.
Although the constitutionality of this procedure, generally known as
the "one-house veto," has not been squarely resolved, it does provide
a practical and politically acceptable method for granting authority to
64. To ensure that the review process worked most effectively, the proposal is designed
so that there would be few presidential interventions, perhaps fewer than 10 in a year.
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the President that Congress would be unwilling to grant without such
a condition. 65
(4) No such Order could be issued with respect to any agency se-
lection among competing applicants for the grant or renewal of a
particular license or privilege or any subsequent revocation of such
a particular license or privilege.
The purpose is self-evident. Choices between competitors for gov-
ernment licenses, and decisions to revoke such licenses, are not neces-
sary for the making of effective economic policy. There is no reason
to create such an opportunity for presidential favoritism. An argument
could be made for barring presidential intervention to change any
licensing order, but this could prevent him from resolving such po-
tentially critical policy issues as whether a proposed nuclear or coal-
fired generating plant, or an Alaska pipeline, should or should not
be licensed (as opposed to deciding which party should get a license
that will as a matter of course be granted to one of several parties).
On balance, and always subject to the one-house veto and judicial
review, the President ought to have the final say on such critical policy
issues.
(5) Any agency order resulting from such an Executive Order
would be subject to judicial review for conformity with the statutory
powers governing such agency, except that the President's determi-
nation of relative priority among statutory goals of the particular
agency and of other government agencies would be deemed conclu-
sive if a rational basis therefor is set out in the Executive Order.
Judicial review of agency orders resulting from such Executive Or-
ders would be expedited in accordance with a specified statutory
timetable not exceeding 180 days for all proceedings up to and in-
cluding the filing of appeals or petitions for review in the Supreme
Court.
65. For a discussion of various mechanisms employed to change the traditional way
in which Congress and the President interact see Ginnane, The Control of Federal Ad-
ministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 569 (1953).
A case that may result in a definitive adjudication is now pending. It involves the
Comptroller General's plea for a declaration that the President has wrongfully persisted
in impounding funds despite a one-house veto of the impoundment order under the
Budget Impoundment and Control Act. Staats v. Ford, No. 75-0551 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 15,
1975).
We have also considered the possibility that the proposed statute could authorize both
houses of Congress to take the initiative by passing a joint resolution that accelerates an
agency proceeding or modifies an agency action, subject to presidential veto. But since
this is the practical equivalent of a statute, it is an option always open to the Congress,
and does not require new legislation.
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The purpose of the judicial review provision is to assure both Con-
gtess and affected citizens that the President's decision is one au-
thorized by the agency's statute, while at the same time authorizing the
President, subject to House or Senate veto, to establish priorities among
conflicting statutory objectives in the same or different regulatory
statutes. The time limit on judicial review is one that was successfully
applied in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 60 and seems appro-
priate for the small number of cases in which presidential direction
would probably occur.
Conclusion
Obviously, the plan outlined above does not answer all possible ques-
tions about its thrust and practical application. It would have to be
carefully structured to allow effective presidential intervention but
at the same time to preserve the traditional values of fairness, open
and public debate, and visible decisionmaking of the type that is neces-
sary for meaningful accountability. The premise that underlies the
proposal is that some increase in the President's ability to intervene
openly when he deems the issue sufficiently important will make him
chargeable with political responsibility for the agency's action, and
will make him more accountable for not intervening when the elec-
torate thinks he should. At the same time, the provision for a one-
house congressional veto will require the Congress to assume a simi-
lar accountability, even when it is reluctant or unable to take the
initiative by enacting a corrective statute. In short, our proposal would
make a reality out of Harry Truman's pithy phrase, "The buck
stops here."
Many voters will oppose any further concentration of governmental
decisionmaking power, especially in "political" hands. For their part,
many elected politicians would prefer not to be held so clearly re-
sponsible for regulatory actions. Moreover, there is always a danger
that the power to intervene could be abused.
Nevertheless, since presidential intervention to favor special friends
or interests would be highly visible and therefore involve high political
risks, the dangers of abuse in our proposal do not appear overwhelming.
Moreover, the President's actions will rarely if ever be directed at a
66. Pub. L. No. 93-206, 87 Stat. 985 (1974).
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particular result for or against a particular company in a particular
agency proceeding. Most instances of regulatory failure stem from the
inability of independent and expert bodies with separate missions to
set national policy priorities and execute them in a balanced and po-
litically acceptable fashion. Under our proposal the President, if he
persuades Congress not to block his action, would have the power to
set and execute such priorities when he believes that an agency has
failed to do so or that the policies set by two or more agencies are
in conflict. That is precisely the power that no one possesses under
the existing regulatory structure. It is nothing more nor less than
the power to govern effectively and accountably in the present age.
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